HUSERLOVA FENOMENOLOŠKA METODOLOGIJA/HUSSERL’S PHENOMENOLOGICAL METHODOLOGY
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.66911/2303-5862.2026.116Keywords:
Edmund Husserl, phenomenology, epoché, reduction, transcendental subjectivityAbstract
The paper examines the basic features of Edmund Husserl’s phenomenological method, with particular emphasis on the distinction between the natural and the transcendental attitude, as well as on the role of the phenomenological epoché and the transcendental reduction. Starting from Husserl’s diagnosis of the crisis of the European sciences, it is argued that phenomenology is not merely a descriptive analysis of consciousness, but an attempt to establish philosophy as a universal science. By suspending the natural attitude and returning to transcendental subjectivity, phenomenology investigates the conditions of possibility of all knowledge and clarifies the foundation of objectivity. This opens the possibility of overcoming the gap between science and the question of human existence.
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