SPOZNAJNA MATRICA REALNOG SUBJEKTIVITETA U MARXOVOJ TEORIJI PRAKSE/THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL MATRIX OF REAL SUBJECTIVITY IN MARX’S THEORY OF PRACTICE

Abstract

Marx’s theory of practice is founded on a radical reconceptualization of the relationship between thought and material reality, where practice is not merely a means of changing the world, but the fundamentum in re of cognition itself. In Marx’s epistemological matrix, practice articulates the unity of the subjective and the objective: it is a process in which forms of thought and material relations mutually transform one another. Cognition, within this framework, does not emerge as passive reflection, but as active intervention, wherein the truth of ideas is tested through their effects in real historical conditions.

The aim of this paper is to explore the epistemological-theoretical elements implicit in Marx’s concept of practice, and to demonstrate how they structure his epistemology through a historical-materialist prism.

For Marx, practice has a dual nature: on the one hand, it is a form of the material production of life; on the other, it structures and directs the very possibilities of cognition, shaping the horizons of possible thinking (horizontes cogitandi). Thus, the epistemological matrix of Marx’s theory of practice abolishes traditional metaphysical dichotomies (subject/object, theory/practice) and replaces them with a historically articulated network in which all phenomenal forms of the world are the result of production.

Accordingly, cognition is always historical, rooted in concrete relations of production and struggle, and its validity does not stem from formal-logical structures, but from practical-historical verification. Marx thereby develops a paradigm in which truth is processual, verified not through ontological contemplation but through transformative practice, which simultaneously alters both the subject of cognition and its material basis — and thereby its very cognitive potentials.